



A survey on Different Security Attacks in MANET

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Abstract:-

Mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is one of the most promising fields for research and development of wireless network. As the popularity of mobile device and wireless networks significantly increased over the past years, wireless ad-hoc networks has now become one of the most vibrant and active field of communication and networks. Due to severe challenges, the special features of MANET bring this technology great opportunistic together. We found that many of the presently existing attacks have some common features and have been categorized into different attacks based on their minor differences.

Keywords: - [MANET Security, Security Attacks, different Routing attacks,]

1. INTRODUCTION

A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a self-configuring network of mobile nodes. It lacks any fixed infrastructure like access points or base stations. It lacks centralized administration and is connected by wireless links/cables.

Wireless ad hoc network can be build up where there is no support of wireless access or wired backbone is not feasible. All network services of ad hoc network are configured and created on the fly. Thus it is obvious that with lack of infrastructural support and susceptible wireless link attacks,

security in ad hoc network becomes inherent weakness.

Nodes within nomadic environment with access to common radio link can easily participate to set up ad hoc infrastructure. But the secure communication among nodes requires the secure communication link to communicate. Before establishing secure communication link the node should be capable enough to identify another node. As a result node needs to provide his/her identity as well as associated credentials to another node. However delivered identity and credentials need to be authenticated and protected so that authenticity and integrity of delivered identity and credentials cannot be questioned by receiver node.

The proliferation of cheaper, small and more powerful devices make MANET a fastest growing network. An ad-hoc network is self-organizing and adaptive. Device in mobile ad hoc network should be able to detect the presence of other devices and perform necessary set up to facilitate communication and sharing of data and service. Ad hoc networking allows the devices to maintain connections to the network as well as easily adding and removing devices to and from the network. Due to nodal mobility, the network topology may change rapidly and unpredictably over time. The network is decentralized, where network organization and message delivery must be executed by the nodes themselves.

Message routing is a problem in a decentralized environment where the topology fluctuates.

2. SECURITY THREATS IN MANAET

Ad hoc Networks are the networks formed for a particular purpose. These networks assume that an end to end path between the nodes exists. They are often created on –thefly and for one-time or temporary use. They find their use in special applications like military, disaster relief etc that arein a need of forming a new infrastructure less network with all pre-existing infrastructure being destroyed.Characteristics of Ad hoc networks include:

- 1) Lack of fixed infrastructure: An ad-hoc network is a collection of nodes that do not rely on pre -existing infrastructure for their connectivity. So these types of networks are flexible and easily reconfigurable.
- 2) Limited resources: Due to lack of fixed infrastructures, these networks have limited resources for their use. Resources like battery power, bandwidth, computation power, memory etc have to be used judiciously for the survival and proper functioning of the network.
- 3) Dynamic Topology: Nodes in the ad hoc networks are often mobile wireless devices like laptops, PDAs, smartphones etc resulting in frequent change of their location, resulting in a dynamic topology.
- 4) Autonomous Networks i.e. stand-alone self-organized system: Due to their decentralized nature, these networks eliminate the complexities of infrastructure setup, enabling devices to create and join networks "on the fly" anywhere, anytime, for any application. A node in the ad hoc networks can communicate with all other nodes which are in its transmission range. Nodes in the network are self-sufficient for the purposes like routing application messages, assuring security of the network and so on.

- 5) Cost effective: All the above described features make these networks cost effective by removing the necessity of servers, cables for internet connectivity, routers etc.

3. CLASSIFICATION OF ATTACKS

As previously discussed, we have categorized the presently existing attacks into two broad categories: DATA traffic attacks and CONTROL traffic attacks.This classification is based on their common characteristics and attack goals. For example: Black-Hole attack drops packets every time, while Gray-Hole attack also drops packets but its action is based on two conditions: time or sender node. But from network point of view, both attacks drop packets and Gray-Hole attack can be considered as a Black-Hole attack when it starts dropping packets. So they can be categorized under a single category.

Attacks

We can classify attacks as passive or active.

1. Passive attacks:

In a passive attack an unauthorized node monitors and aims to find out information about the network. The attackers do not otherwise need to communicate with the network. Hence they do not disrupt communications or cause any direct damage to the network. However, they can be used to get information for future harmful attacks. Examples of passive attacks are eavesdropping and traffic analysis. Eavesdropping Attacks, also known as disclosure attacks, are passive attacks by external or internal nodes. The attacker can analyze broadcast messages to reveal some useful information about the network. Solutions protecting the radio interface from attacks such as eavesdropping (and jamming) attacks have been proposed in the literature, e.g. spread spectrum communication and frequency hopping [3]. Traffic Analysis is not necessarily an entirely passive activity. It is perfectly feasible to engage in protocols, or seek to

provoke communication between nodes. Attackers may employ techniques such as RF direction finding, traffic rate analysis, and time-correlation monitoring.

1. Traffic analysis in ad hoc networks may reveal:

- The existence and location of nodes;
- The communications network topology;
- The roles played by nodes;
- The current sources and destination of communications; and
- The current location of specific individuals or functions

Active Attacks:

These attacks cause unauthorized state changes in the network such as denial of service, modification of packets, and the like. These attacks are generally launched by users or nodes with authorization to operate within the network. We classify active attacks into four groups: dropping, modification, fabrication, and timing attacks.

It should be noted that an attack can be classified into more than one group.

Dropping Attacks:

Malicious or selfish nodes deliberately drop all packets that are not destined for them. While malicious nodes aim to disrupt the network connection, selfish nodes aim to preserve their resources. Dropping attacks can prevent end-to-end communications between nodes, if the dropping node is at a critical point. It might also reduce the network performance by causing data packets to be retransmitted, new routes to the destination to be discovered, and the like. Unfortunately most routing protocols (DSR is an exception [2]) have no mechanism to detect whether data packets have been forwarded or not. However, they can be detected by neighboring nodes through passive acknowledgement or hop-by-hop acknowledgement at the data link layer. An

attacker can choose to drop only some packets to avoid being detected; this is called selective dropping attack. Besides data packets or route discovery packets, an attacker can also drop route error packets, causing the source node to be unaware of failed links.

Modification Attacks:

Insider attackers modify packets to disrupt the network. For example, in the sinkhole attack the attacker tries to attract nearly all traffic from a particular area through a compromised node by making the compromised node attractive to other nodes. It is especially effective in routing protocols that use advertised information such as remaining energy and nearest node to the destination in the route discovery process. A sinkhole attack can be used as a basis for further attacks like dropping and selective forwarding attacks. A black hole attack is like a sinkhole attack that attracts traffic through itself and uses it as the basis for further attacks.

The goal is to prevent packets being forwarded to the destination. If the black hole is a virtual node or a node outside the network, it is hard to detect

Fabrication Attacks:

Here the attacker forges network packets. Fabrication attacks are classified into "active forge" in which attackers send faked messages without receiving any related message and "forge reply" in which the attacker sends fake route reply messages in response to related legitimate route request messages.

In the forge reply attack, the attacker forges a Route Reply message after receiving a Route Request message. The reply message contains falsified routing information showing that the node has a fresh route to the destination node on AODV in order to suppress real routes to the destination. It causes route disruption by causing messages to be sent to a non-

existent node or putting the attacker itself into the route between two endpoints of a communication channel if the insider attacker has already have a route to the destination.

Attackers can initiate frequent packets to cause denial of service (DoS). Example DoS attacks that exploit MANETs' features are sleep deprivation, torture attacks, routing table overflow attacks, ad hoc flooding attacks, rushing attacks, and the like. The sleep deprivation torture attack consumes a node's battery power and so disables the node. It does so by persistently making service requests of one from another.

The hello flood attack is another attack that makes the adversary attractive for many routes. In some routing protocols, nodes broadcast Hello packets to detect neighboring nodes. These messages are received by all one-hop neighbor nodes, but are not forwarded to further nodes. The attacker broadcasts many Hello packets with large enough transmission power that each node receiving Hello packets assumes the adversary node to be its neighbor. It can be highly effective in both proactive and reactive MANET protocols. A further significant attack on MANETs is the collaborative.

4. ROUTING ATTACKS

There are several attacks which can be mounted on the routing protocols and may disrupt the proper operation of the network. Brief descriptions of such attacks are given below:

Routing Table Overflow: In the case of routing table overflow, the attacker creates routes to nonexistent nodes. The goal is to create enough routes to prevent new routes from being created or to overwhelm the protocol implementation. In the case of proactive routing algorithms we need to discover routing information even before it is needed, while in the case of reactive algorithms we need to find a route only when it is needed. Thus main objective of such an

attack is to cause an overflow of the routing tables, which would in turn prevent the creation of entries corresponding to new routes to authorized nodes.

Table Poisoning: In routing table poisoning, the compromised nodes present in the networks send fictitious routing updates or modify genuine route update packets sent to other authorized nodes. Routing table poisoning may result in sub-optimal routing, congestion in portions of the network, or even make some parts of the network inaccessible.

Packet Replication: In the case of packet replication, an attacker replicates stale packets. This consumes additional bandwidth and battery power resources available to the nodes and also causes unnecessary confusion in the routing process.

Route Cache Poisoning: In the case of on-demand routing protocols, each node maintains a route cache which holds information regarding routes that have become known to the node in the recent past. Similar to routing table poisoning, an adversary can also poison the route cache to achieve similar objectives.

Rushing Attack: On-demand routing protocols that use duplicate suppression during the route discovery process are vulnerable to this attack. An attacker which receives a route request packet from the initiating node floods the packet quickly throughout the network before other nodes which also receive the same route request packet can react. Nodes that receive the legitimate route request packets assume those packets to be duplicates of the packet already received through the attacker and hence discard those packets. Any route discovered by the source node would contain the attacker as one of the intermediate nodes. Hence, the source node would not be able to find secure routes, that is, routes that do not include the attacker. It is extremely difficult to detect such attacks in ad hoc wireless networks.

CONCLUSION

This paper presented a number of popular attacks like, active and passive attacks, routing table poisoning attack, impersonation and rushing attacks in MANETs. There is a need to make them more secure and robust to adapt to the demanding requirements of these networks. The flexibility, ease and speed with which these networks can be set up imply they will gain wider application. This leaves Ad-hoc networks wide open for research to meet these demanding application. The research on MANET security is still in its early stage. The existing proposals are typically attack-oriented in that they first identify several security threats and then enhance the existing protocol or propose a new protocol to thwart such threats.

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